O economista
Tyler Cowen escreveu um artigo muito interessante no jornal
New York Times onde afirma que o conflito entre os Estados Unidos e a Rússia sobre a Ucrânia deve ser visto como um jogo de xadrez. Concordo com a teoria dissuasão do mercado. "A more reassuring kind of deterrence has to do with the response of Russian markets to the crisis. Russia is a far more globalized economy than it was during the Soviet era. On the first market day after the Crimean takeover, the reaction was a plunging ruble, and a decline in the Russian stock market of more than 10 percent. Russia’s central bank raised interest rates to 7 percent from 5.5 percent to protect the ruble’s value. Such market reactions penalize Russian decision makers, who also know that a broader conflict would endanger Russia’s oil and gas revenue, which makes up about 70 percent of its export income. In this case, market forces provide a relatively safe form of deterrence. Unlike governmental sanctions, market-led penalties limit the risk of direct political retaliation, making it harder for the Russian government to turn falling market prices into a story of victimization by outside powers...How much credibility will the United States lose if it doesn’t respond forcefully to Russian action? This, too, is a problem of game theory"
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário